Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 25
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

22. When the news of these disasters one after¹ another had reached Rome, great sorrow and alarm, it is true, took possession of the state. Nevertheless because the consuls, to whom fell the supreme command, were up to that time successful, they were less disturbed by these disasters. [2] They² sent Gaius Laetorius and Marcus Metilius³ as legates to the consuls, to inform them that they should carefully gather up the remnants of the two armies, and see to it that in fear and despair they did not surrender to the enemy, as had happened after the disaster at Cannae; [3] also that they should search for the deserters from the army of slave-volunteers. The same duty was given to Publius Cornelius, to whom the levy also had been assigned. [4] And he issued an edict in the market-towns and local centres,⁴ that search should be made for the slave-volunteers, and that they be brought back to their standards. All these things were done with the utmost diligence.

[5] Appius Claudius, the consul, placed Decimus Junius in command at the mouth of the Volturnus and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli, in order that, as fast as ships came in from Etruria and Sardinia, they should send the grain at once to the camps. [6] He himself, on returning to Capua, found his colleague Quintus Fulvius transporting everything from Casilinum and making every preparation for the siege of Capua. [7] Then they both invested the city and summoned the praetor, Claudius Nero, from the Claudian camp at Suessula. He, leaving there only a garrison of moderate size to hold the place, likewise came down with all the rest of his forces to Capua. [8] Thus three headquarters were set up around Capua. There were three armies too that, [p. 427]fell to work on different sides, made ready to encircle⁵ the city with a ditch and an earthwork, and erected redoubts at moderate intervals; [9] and at many points at the same time they fought with such success against the Campanians who endeavoured to hinder the works that finally the Campanians remained inside the gates and the wall. [10] But before these siege-works could be made continuous, legates were sent to Hannibal, to complain that Capua had been deserted by him and almost given back to the Romans, and to implore him to bring aid, then at least, to men not only besieged but also encircled by entrenchments. [11] The consuls received a letter from Publius Cornelius, the praetor, ordering⁶ that, before enclosing Capua with their works, they should permit such of the Campanians as wished to do so to leave Capua and carry their possessions with them. [12] Those who should leave before the fifteenth of March were to be free men and to keep all their property; those who left after that date and those who remained there were to be reckoned enemies. These terms were published to the Campanians, and were received with such contempt by them that they were actually insulting and made threats.

[13] Hannibal had led his legions from Herdonea to Tarentum in the hope of getting possession of the citadel of Tarentum either by force or by ruse. [14] When this did not succeed, he turned aside to Brundisium, thinking that town would certainly be betrayed. While there also he was wasting time, the Campanian legates came to him with complaints and at the same time entreaties. Hannibal replied to them grandly that he had previously raised a siege, and that now also the consuls would not [p. 429]withstand his coming. [15] With this hope the legates were⁷ sent away, and it was with difficulty [16??] that they were able to return to Capua, now surrounded by two trenches and a double earthwork.