[p. 2]
CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT?
(AN VIRTUS DOCERI POSSIT)
INTRODUCTION
This slight and possibly fragmentary essay, or declamation,
makes no considerable addition to the
theory of knowledge. Virtue is assumed to be an
‘art’; since the practice of all other arts is unsuccessful
without instruction, Virtue (
ἀρετή), or the
Good Life (
τὸ εὖ ζῆν), or Prudence (
φρόνησις) - for
Plutarch appears to equate the three - must be
learned, if we are to be successful in the dependent
arts. Plutarch appeals as usual to common sense,
but does not take the trouble to prove any of his
assumptions; yet the work, even in its present
mutilated state, is a graceful exercise in popular
philosophy.
While Plutarch's slipshod and half-defined position
is not directly contrary to that of Plato (
e.g. in the
Meno), it must be observed that two pupils of Socrates,
Crito and Simon, wrote works with the titles,
Ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν οἱ ἀγαθοί (
That Men are not made
Good by Instruction) and
Περὶ ἀρετῆς ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν
(
That Virtue cannot be Taught), respectively.
1 Whether
these books differed radically from the Platonic or
Socratic position, as developed in the
Meno and the
Republic, cannot be argued here.
We must note in passing that G. Siefert (
Commentationes
Ienenses, 1896, pp. 102-105) held that Plutarch
[p. 3]
wrote this work in connexion with the
De Fortuna (see
the parallels recorded in the notes) and that it is not
mutilated, but unfinished.
2 This is quite possible.
3
The text is very uncertain, for although the essay
appears in several important classes of MSS., they differ
considerably among themselves. The text which
must serve as the basis of the present translation is
only presented with the greatest hesitation.
The work appears as No. 180 in the Lamprias
catalogue, where it bears the title
Περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰ διδακτέονβερναρδακις ωουλδ ριγητλψ εμενδ το διδακτὸν. ἡ ἀρετή.