[1028b]
[1]
rather than its quality or quantity or
position; because we know each of these points too when we know
what the quantity or quality is.Indeed, the question which was raised
long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles
us—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What is
substance?" Some say that it is one1; others, more
than one; some, finite2; others, infinite.3 And so for us too our chief and primary and
practically our only concern is to investigate the nature of "being"
in the sense of substance.Substance is thought to be
present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants and
their parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water,
earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of
these, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible
universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.We must consider whether (a) these are
the only substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some of
these, or (d) some of these and some others, or (e) none of these, but
certain others. Some4 hold that the bounds of body—i.e.
the surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a
truer sense than body or the solid.Again, some5 believe that there is
nothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe in
eternal entities more numerous and more real than sensible
things.
[20]
Thus Plato
posited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds of
substance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies;and Speusippus6 assumed still more kinds of
substances, starting with "the One," and positing principles for each
kind: one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for
the soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. Some7 again hold that the Forms and
numbers have the same nature, and that other things—lines
and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the
substance of the visible universe and sensible things.We must consider, then, with
regard to these matters, which of the views expressed is right and
which wrong; and what things are substances; and whether there are any
substances besides the sensible substances, or not; and how sensible
substances exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if
so, why and how) or no substance besides the sensible ones. We must
first give a rough sketch of what substance is.The
term "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principal
cases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held
to be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. The
substrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is not
itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine its
nature,
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