[
1033b]
[1]
E.g., we make a bronze sphere; we do
this in the sense that from A, i.e. bronze, we make B, i.e. a
sphere.If, then, we
make the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to make it in
the same way; and the processes of generation will continue to
infinity.
It is therefore obvious
that the form (or whatever we should call the shape in the sensible
thing) is not generated—generation does not apply to
it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is
induced in something else either by art or by nature or by
potency.But we do
cause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from bronze and a
sphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the result
is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is
generated, something must be generated from something; for that which
is generated will always have to be divisible, and be partly one thing
and partly another; I mean partly matter and partly form.If then a sphere is the figure
whose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part of
this will be the medium in which that which we produce will be
contained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be the
thing generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious,
then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form or
essence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is called
after it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matter
is present, and one part is matter and the other form.
[20]
Is there then some
sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the
bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if
form had existed thus independently.
1 Form means "of such a kind"; it is not a
definite individual, but we produce or generate from the individual
something "of such a kind"; and when it is generated it is an
individual "of such a kind."The whole individual, Callias or
Socrates, corresponds to "this bronze sphere," but
"man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in general.
Obviously therefore the cause which consists
of the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming that
there are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at least
of generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any
rate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances.Indeed in some cases it is even
obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which is
generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one
with it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for
man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as when
a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that which
would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above
them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is
both.
2