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[1318b]
[1]
either a decision
must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on
questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover
the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade
people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and
justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper
hand pay no attention to them.There being four kinds of democracy, the
best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses
preceding these1; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first
as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common
people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce
democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by
agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property
they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to
their having2 the necessaries of life they pass their time
attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors' goods, but find
more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office,
where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of
mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the
tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent
them from working or
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rob them; for
then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they
have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to
account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the
people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a
special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of
deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must
be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at
Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is
advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary
institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them
to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest
magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher
offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to
be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the
ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed
well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with
the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper
classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the
upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others
inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class
will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not
to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do
whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man's
character.
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