E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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Having considered the divisions of the speech in general we now come to the details, to the enumeration and examination of the ordinary contents of each of the four. These in each case are discussed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric. The treatment of the προοίμιον occupies the 14th chapter, to which is appended a second, c. xv, which analyses the topics of διαβολή, the art of ‘setting a man against his neighbour’, infusing suspicion and hostile feeling against him in the minds of others, raising a prejudice against him—especially of course in the minds of judges against your opponent. One would be sorry to be obliged to call this ‘calumniating’. Διήγησις is treated in c. xvi, πίστεις in xvii: to which is attached in xviii a digression on ἐρώτησις, the mode of putting questions—this includes the ‘answer’, repartee: and the 19th chapter, appropriately enough, concludes the work with the conclusion (ἐπίλογος, peroration) of the speech.

The prooemium is thus defined by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30). I, ἀκροατῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλαίῳ μὴ εἰδόσι δήλωσις, ἵνα γιγνώσκωσι περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθῶσί τε τῇ ὑποθέσει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προσέχειν παρακαλέσαι, καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν εὔνους ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι. These rules seem to be chiefly derived from the actual practice of the Orators. Some of the arts to which public speakers had recourse in the topics of their prooemium are mentioned by Isocrates, Paneg. § 13. Compare Cic. de Orat. II 19. 80; de Invent. I 15. 20; where it is defined: it has two parts, principium (the object of this is to make the hearer benevolum aut docilem aut attentum,) and insinuatio, oratio quadam dissimulatione et circuitione obscura subiens auditoris animum. Quint. IV. c. I, seq. principium exordium. He agrees with the preceding; see § 5. On the προοίμιον as a hymn, see Stallbaum ad Phaed. 60 D. On the prooemium in Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. II 78, 79, principia dicendi. [See also Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen ü. Römer § 12, die Einleitung.]

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‘Now the prooemium is the beginning of a speech and stands in the place of the prologue in poetry (i. e. tragedy, and specially of Euripides' tragedy), and of the prelude in flute music’.

προαύλιον] an introduction, ornamental, and preparatory to, not an essential part of, the theme or subject of the composition; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving of the way (preparation, pioneering of the road) for what follows (ὁδοποίησις, note on I 1. 2).

‘Now the flute-prelude is like the prooemium of the epideictic branch: that is to say, as the flute-players first open their performance with whatever they can play best (in order to gain attention and favour of the audience) which they then join on to the ἐνδόσιμον (the actual opening, preliminary notes, of the subject which gives the tone, or cue, to the rest), so in the epideictic speeches the writing (of the προοίμιον) ought to be of this kind: for (in these the speaker) may say first (εἰπόντα) anything he pleases, and then should at once sound the note of preparation, and join on (the rest)’.

This represents the epideictic prooemium, like the flute-prelude, as hardly at all connected with what follows; it is a preliminary flourish, anything that he knows to be likely to be most successful, as already observed, to conciliate the audience and put them in good humour. “For here, as there is no real interest at stake, the author is allowed a much greater liberty in his choice of topics for amusing (and gaining over) an audience; a license which would be intolerable in a case of life and death, or in the suggestion of a course of action which may involve the safety or ruin of the state. Here the audience are too eager to come to the point to admit of any trifling with their anxiety.” Introd. pp. 337, 8. Cic. de Or. II 80. 325, Connexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tanquam citharoedi prooemium affictum aliquod, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur (Victorius). Quint. II 8. 8, in demonstrativis (Arist.) prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.

The ἐνδόσιμον (subaudi ἆσμα or κροῦσμα, Bos, Ellips. s. v.) occurs again Pol. V (VIII) 5 init. apparently in the same sense as here, ‘introduction’; also Pseudo-Arist. de Mundo, c. 6 § 20, where we have κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα κ.τ.λ. ‘for according to the law above, by him who might be rightly called leader of the chorus, the stars are set in motion, &c.’ I have given this in full because it throws some light upon the meaning of ἐνδόσιμον, and explains its metaphorical application, God is here represented as the leader of a chorus who gives the time, the keynote, and the mode or tune, to the rest, and thus acts as a guide to be followed, or (in a similar sense) as an introduction, or preparatory transition to something else. It thus has the effect of the ‘key-note’, and takes the secondary sense of a ‘guide’, ‘preparation for’, ‘introduction to’, anything. So Plut. de disc. adul. ab amico, c. 55, 73 B, ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἕξει πρὸς τὰ μείζονα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ubi Wyttenbach, occasio, incitamentum; similarly Ib. c. 30, 70 B, καὶ ψόγος...ἢ ἔπαινος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον εἰς παῤῥησίαν ἐστιν, ‘gives the tone, the cue, i.e. the occasion or incitement, to freedom (taking liberties).’ See other passages from Plutarch and others in Wyttenbach's note on 73 B. Gaisford and Wyttenbach refer to Gataker ad Anton. XI 20, p. 336 (G), XI 26 (W), “ἐνδ. usurpatur pro modulationis exordio, quo praecentor sive chori praefectus cantandi reliquis auspicium facit. Hesychius, ἐνδόσιμον, τὸ πρὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς κιθάρισμα.” ap. Gaisford Not. Var. Wyttenbach describes ἐνδόσιμον as “signum et adhortatio in certaminibus et musicis et gymnicis: tum ad alias res translatum.” Lastly Athen. XIII 2, 556 A, of certain authors, οἷς τὸ ἐνδόσιμον Ἀριστοτέλης ἔδωκεν ἱστορῶν τοῦτο ἐν τῷ περὶ εὐγενείας, ‘gave the tone, i.e. hint’, furnished the occasion for their statement. Schweighäuser, ad loc. says, “Dalecampius vertit quos ad id scribendum provocavit Ar. Dicitur autem proprie praecentus praeludium, exordium melodiae quod praeit chorodidascalus cui dein accinere oportet chorum. H. Stephanus' Thesaurus. Budaeus in Comm. Gr. Ling. p. 874 sq. ἐνδόσιμον διδόναι or παρέχειν is expressed in one word ἐνδιδόναι XII 520 D,” as it is here by Aristotle.

‘And this is done by all. An example is the prooemium of Isocrates' Helen: for there is nothing in common between the disputatious dia lecticians, and Helen’. The prooemium, which occupies the first thirteen sections of the speech, includes many other subjects besides the ἐριστικοί, and is certainly an excellent illustration of the want of connexion between proem and the rest in an epideictic speech. Quint. III 8. 8, In demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat (Ar.). Nam et longe a materia duci hoc, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari.

‘And at the same time also (it has this further recommendation) that if (the speaker thus) migrate into a foreign region, there is this propriety in it, that the entire speech is not of the same kind’ (it removes the wearisome monotony which is characteristic of this branch of Rhetoric).

ἐκτοπίζειν is to ‘change one's residence’, and applied especially to migratory birds and animals. It is always neuter in Aristotle. Hist. Anim. VIII 12. 3 and 8, IX 10. 1, IV 8. 23, ἐκτοπισμοὺς ποιοῦνται, VIII 13. 14, ἐκτοπιστικὰ ζῷα, I 1. 26. In the primary sense of absence from one's proper or ordinary place, Pol. VIII (v) 11, 1314 b 9, τοῖς ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας, and so ἔκτοπος, ἐκτόπιος, ἄτοπος ‘out of their proper place’.

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‘The introductions in the epideictic branch are derived from praise and blame (naturally: see 1 3 §§ 3, 4); as, for instance, Gorgias' opening of his Olympic oration (a πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, delivered at the Olympic games), “By many’ (or ὑπέρ, ‘for many things’; which seems more in accordance with what followed) ‘are ye worthy to be admired, O men of Hellas”: that is to say (γάρ videlicet) he praises those who first brought together the general assemblies’. Comp. Quint. III 8. 9, (continuation of the preceding quotation) et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui primi tales instituerunt conventus (translated from Ar.). Another short fragment of this oration is preserved by Philostr. Vit. Soph. 1 9. Ὁ δὲ Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος, says Philostratus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῷ (Gorgiae) ἐπολιτεύθη: στασιάζουσαν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁρῶν ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέπων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἆθλα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὅπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. The rest of his fragments, genuine and spurious, are collected by Sauppe Or. Att. III 129, seq. [See also Appendix to Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias.] Hieronymus adv. Iovin. (quoted by Wyttenbach on Plut. 144 B), “Gorgias rhetor librum pulcerrimum de concordia, Graecis tunc inter se dissidentibus, recitavit Olympiae.” Isocr., Panegyr. § 3, after stating the nature of the contents of his own speech, adds, in allusion to this, with others, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὥρμησαν.

‘But Isocrates blames them for that bodily excellences they rewarded with gifts, whilst to intellectual excellence they awarded no prize’. This is the substance of the two first sections of Isocr. Paneg. Mr Sandys, in his note ad locum, gives a summary of the whole exordium §§ 1—14. Victorius points out this as one of the places in which Aristotle's hostility to Isocrates appears! The problem here proposed by Isocr.—the omission of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition—is solved by Arist., Probl. XXX 11.

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‘(A second topic for an epideictic prooemium) is derived from advice (the deliberative branch); for instance “men are bound to pay honour to the good”, and therefore he, the speaker, himself is going to praise Aristides’ (αὐτός is obliqua oratio: the directa oratio would have been ἐγώ: it is a sort of semi-quotation: where it comes from no one seems to know); ‘or, to all such as though not distinguished are yet not bad, only their merits are buried in obscurity, as Alexander (Paris), Priam's son. For one who speaks thus offers advice’. The encomium Alexandri here referred is doubtless the same as that which has been already mentioned in II 23. 5, 8, 12 and II 27. 7, 9; the author is unknown.

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‘Further (a third kind) they may be borrowed from the forensic introductions; that is to say, from the appeals to the audience, or as an apology to them, (comp. infra § 7)—when the subject of the speech happens to be either paradoxical (contrary to ordinary opinion or expectation, and therefore incredible), or painful¹, or trite and worn-out, and therefore tiresome (τεθρυλημένου that which is in everyone's mouth, decantatum, note on II 21. 11)—for the purpose of obtaining indulgence (with an apologetic object); as Choerilus says, for instance, “But now when all is spent”’ (lit. has been distributed sc. amongst others; and nothing is left for me). [Compare Virgil's omnia iam vulgata in the Exordium of the third Georgic.]

Of the four Choeriluses distinguished by Näke, this is the Epic poet of Samos, born, according to Näke, in B.C. 470. His principal work, from which this fragment is taken, was a poetical narrative of the Persian wars with Greece under Darius and Xerxes—“all that was left him” by his predecessors—very much applauded, as Suidas tell us, and “decreed to be read with Homer.” Aristotle (Top. Θ I, ult. παραδείγματα...οἷα Ὅμηρος, μὴ οἷα Χοίριλος) thinks less favourably of it; and it was afterwards excluded from the Alexandrian Canon in favour of the poem of Antimachus. An earlier Choerilus was the Athenian tragic poet, contemporary with Phrynichus, Pratinas, and Aeschylus in early life; the third a slave of the Comic poet Ecphantides, whom he is said to have assisted in the composition of his plays; and the fourth, Horace's Choerilus, Ep. II 1. 232, Ars Poet. 357, a later and contemptible epic poet who attended Alexander on his expedition, and according to Horace, incultis qui versibus et male natis rettulit acceptos, regale nomisma, Philippos. Suidas tells this story of the Samian Choerilus, an evident mistake. The fragments of the Choerilus of our text are all collected and commented on by Näke in his volume on Choerilus. This fragm. is given on p. 104. See also Düntzer Epic. Gr. Fragm. p. 96 seq. where five lines of the poem, from which our extract is made are given: and the four articles in Biogr. Dict. The context is supplied by the Schol. on this passage—see in Spengel's ed., Scholia Graeca², p. 160: printed also in Näke and Düntzer—and runs thus: ἆ μάκαρ, ὅστις ἔην κεῖνον χρόνον ἴδρις ἀοιδῆς, Μουσάων θεράπων ὅτ᾽ ἀκήρατος ἦν ἔτι λειμών: νῦν δ̓ ὅτε πάντα δέδασται, ἔχουσι δὲ πείρατα τέχναι, ὕστατοι ὥστε δρόμου καταλειπόμεθ̓, οὐδέ πῃ ἐστὶ πάντη παπταίνοντα νεοζυγὲς ἅρμα πελάσσαι. καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς³. Which are certainly pretty lines enough: perhaps the rest was not equal to them. Compare with λειμὼν Μουσάων, and the whole passage, Lucr. I 925 seq. avia Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante trita solo, et seq., which might possibly have been suggested by this of Choerilus. An apology of the same kind is introduced by Isocrates in the middle of his Panegyr. § 74; and another in his ἀντίδοσις, § 55. In the latter the word διατεθρυλημένους occurs.

‘So the introductions of the epideictic speeches are derived from the following topics; from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer: and these “introductions”’ (see the note on § I: ἐνδόσιμα is used here for προοίμια in general, instead of the more limited sense of the preceding passage) ‘must be either foreign or closely connected with the speeches (to which they are prefixed)’.

ξένος, a stranger or foreigner, is properly opposed to οἰκεῖος, domesticus, one of one's own household. This last clause, δεῖ δέ κ.τ.λ. is, as Vater remarks, introduced as a transition to the next topic, the forensic prooemia.

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‘The introduction of the forensic speech must be understood as having the same force (or value, or signification) as the prologue of a drama (τοῦ, the drama to which it belongs), or the introduction to an epic poem: for to the epideictic exordia the preludes (introductions, ἀναβολαί) of the dithyrambs bear resemblance, “for thee and thy gifts, or spoils”’. On the ἀναβολαί, the openings or introductions of dithyrambs, and their loose, incoherent, flighty character, see note on III 9. 1. Introd. p. 307, note 1. It is this which makes them comparable to the epideictic exordia, as above described.

The dramatic, i. e. tragic, prologue, and the introduction of the epic, are compared to the exordium of the dicastic speech, in that all three contain ‘statements of the case’; the last, literally; the tragic and epic, virtually. The prologue of Euripides (who of the three extant tragedians can be the only one whose prologues are referred to) actually states all the preceding circumstances of the story of the drama, which it is necessary that the spectator should be acquainted with in order to enter into the plot. The introduction of the Epic poem is neither so long nor so regular. That of the Iliad occupies only seven lines, and states the subject very simply and in few words. That of the Odyssey is concluded in ten, and little or nothing of the story told. The Aeneid, and Pharsalia have seven apiece.

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Having hinted at the points of resemblance between the dithyrambic ἀναβολαί and the epideictic prooemia, he now proceeds to explain further the resemblance of the dicastic proem to the prologue of tragedy and prelude of the Epic poem.

‘In the prose speeches as well as the poetry’ (Victorius understands τ. λόγοις⁴, fabulae poetarum, meaning the dramas as contrasted with the Epics: the other contrast of prose and verse is more natural as well as more suitable here) ‘these prooemia are (present, offer) a specimen or sample of the subject (of the speech or poem) in order that they may have some previous acquaintance with the intention of it’ (if ἦν, ‘about what it was to be’, as in τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; the object, purpose, or design), ‘and the mind not be kept in suspense; for all that is vague and indefinite keeps the mind wandering (in doubt and uncertainty): accordingly, (the speaker or writer) that puts the beginning into his hand supplies him with a clue, as it were, by which he may hold, so as to enable him to follow the story (or argument). This is why (Homer in the Iliad and Odyssey, began the two poems with the lines quoted; and Choerilus—if Näke u. s. is right about the order of the two fragments in our text—did not begin his poem with ἥγεό μοι κ.τ.λ., but introduced it in his exordium）’—here the quotations from the three poems are introduced, and the sentence remains unfinished.

‘Similarly the tragic poets explain the subject of their play, if not immediately at the opening, as Euripides, at any rate somewhere or other the poet explains it in his prologue or introduction), as even Sophocles (who does not usually employ it; in the Oedip. Tyr. 774 seq.) “Polybus of Corinth was my father, &c.”, and the following.’

“The Commentators object to προλόγῳ here because the passage that it indicates occurs not at the beginning, but in the middle of the play. But, it seems that Aristotle has here used πρόλογος in a more compre hensive sense than that which it usually bears, for an ‘explanatory introduction’ in general, wherever it may occur: and that it has much the same relation here to its ordinary signification, as πρόθεσις has to διήγησις in c. 13. Also the analogous προοίμιον is applied twice in § 10 infra to introductory speeches anywhere in a play.” Introd. p. 339 note.

‘And comedy in like manner’: that is, wherever an introductory explanation is required, there it is introduced. Victorius notes that this appears in Terence, the Latin representative of the New Comedy, and Plautus. Simo in the Andria, Menedemus in the Heautontimorumenos, Micio in the Adelphi, perform this office. And similarly, Strepsiades in Aristoph. Nubes, Demosthenes in the Equites 40 seq., Dionysius in the Ranae—Victorius says “tum maxime cum Servo narrat, &c.,” but the conversation referred to is with Hercules, not Xanthias, lines 64 seq. There is another explanatory introduction, preparatory to the dramatic contest between Aeacus and Xanthias, 759 seq.

‘So then (to resume) the most necessary function of the prooemium, and that peculiar to it, is to make it clear what is the end and object of the speech or story’ (the former is the λόγος in Rhetoric, the latter in the Epic and the drama). Compare Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). I, def. of προοίμιον. ‘And therefore if the subject (the thing, the matter in hand) be already clear and short (or, of trifling importance) the prooemium is not to be employed’. Comp. Cic. de Or. II 79. 320, in parvis atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri saepe commodius: Victorius, who writes frequentibus: repeated in Gaisford, Not. Var.

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‘The other kinds (of prooemia) which are employed are mere cures (remedies [specifics] for the infirmities or defects of the hearers—διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1. 5—such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like), and common’, to all parts of the speech. κοινά is opposed to the special office, peculiar to the προοίμιον, καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο supra. all these other kinds may be introduced in the exordium—and also anywhere else, wherever they are required.

‘These may be derived from the speaker himself, from the hearer, the subject, and the adversary’ (‘the opposite’). Cic. de Or. II 79. 321, seq. Sed quum erit utendum principio, quod plerumque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis apud quos agitur (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκρουτοῦ), sententias duci licebit. Ex reo—reos appello, quorum res est—quae significent bonum virum seq. followed by the illustration of the remaining three. Cicero, who is certainly following Arist., seems here to translate τοῦ λέγοντος by reus, in the sense which he explains, of both parties in the case. Quintilian, IV 1. 6, seems to charge Aristotle— if he includes him in the plerique who have been guilty of the omission— with having neglected to include the ‘auctor causae’ amongst the sources of topics for prooemia. Victorius defends him against this, by pointing out, as Cicero, that ὁ λέγων includes both parties in a suit or prosecution, actor as well as reus (in its ordinary sense). See the passage of Quint., with Spalding's note.

‘The topics derivable from the speaker himself and the opponent, are all such as relate to allaying (lit. ‘refuting’) and exciting prejudice and illfeeling (after ποιῆσαι understand αὐτήν): but with this difference: that in defending oneself all that relates to διαβολή (i. e. the removal of prejudice and ill-will from ourselves, and exciting them against the opponent) must be put first (subaudi λεκτέον, viz. in the exordium), but in the accusation of another reserved for the peroration. The reason of this is not difficult to see; that is, that the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case, must necessarily begin by doing away with all hindrances (sc. to the establishment of it; all prepossessions against him on the part of the judge); and therefore must make the removal or refutation of all calumnies or prejudices against him his first point; whereas the accuser (the speaker whose office it is to ‘set’ the defendant ‘against’ the judges, conciliate their ill-will to him) must reserve all that tends to prejudice his antagonist for the epilogue (peroration, conclusion), that they may better remember it’ (that his accusations may ‘leave their sting behind them’ in the judges' minds). Both Spengel and Bekker write αὑτόν after εͅἰκάζειν for the vulgata lectio αὐτόν; which as far as appears to the contrary is the reading of all MSS. I think αὐτόν for ‘his own case’, lit. himself, is defensible. We often say ‘him’ for ‘himself’, leaving the reflexive part to be understood, in our own language. See note on I 7. 35, and Waitz on Organ. 54 a 14, Vol. I. p. 486, there referred to.

‘The topics of the προοίμιον which are addressed to the hearer (i. e. in the dicastic branch now under consideration, the judges,) are derived from (subaudi γίγνεται, or as before, λέγεται) the conciliation of his good will (towards ourselves) and irritating him (exciting his indignation against the adversary, δείνωσις), and sometimes too (δέ), (but only when it is required,) from engaging his attention or the reverse: for it is not always expedient to make him attentive, and this is why many (speakers) try to move or provoke him to laughter’. Προάγειν εἰς γέλωτα’, to move, or provoke to’. Herod. II 121. 4, σκῶψαί μιν καὶ ἐς γέλωτα προαγαγέσθαι. Rhet. I 1. 5, εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον, 1 2. 5, εἰς πάθος, et sim. ‘to carry forward, i. e. stimulate, excite, provoke’.

εὔνουν ποιῆσαι] “The three requisites in the disposition of the audience, according to the later writers on the subject, are that they should be benevoli, dociles, attenti. Cic. de Inv. 1 15. 20, Quint. IV 1. 5: and frequently elsewhere. Ar. includes the two latter under one head προσεκτικοί: and in fact if a man is inclined to attend, he shews that he is already inclined to or desirous of learning. The two are closely connected, Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23.” Introd. p. 340, note 1.

Causa principii nulla est alia, quam ut auditorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatior, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus, inter auctores plurimos constat si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus; non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere ultra possimus, admittimur. (Quint. IV 1. 5).

οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Or. II 79. 323. He begins by saying that neither of these topics is to be confined to the prooemium § 322, nam et attentum monent Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem (this is included in προσεκτικοί); quae sunt utilia, sed non principii magis propria quam reliquarum partium; faciliora etiam in principiis, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, quum omnia exspectant, et dociles magis initiis esse possunt. Quint., IV 1. 37, 38, criticizes Aristotle's remark on this point: Nec me quanquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intelligi: verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius, et fortasse persuasit: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione: quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docilem et attentum, seq. That is, the judge's inattention often arises not from negligence, but from a mistaken supposition that the adversary is right and we are wrong: in order to set him right we must rouse his attention. The supposition implied here in explanation of οὐκ ἀεὶ συμφ. κ.τ.λ., which Quint. refers to and criticizes, is that inattention on the judge's part is sometimes expedient when our cause is bad. Quint.'s reply is, it is not his inattention that would be of use to us in such a case, but his attention to the arguments which we are about to use in order to convince him to the contrary. Another disadvantage that may arise from over-attention on the judge's part, occurs when we want to slur over an unfavourable point in our case. In illustration of the following διὸ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Gaisford very appositely quotes Arist. Vesp. 564, Οί δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους ἡμῖν, οἱ δ᾽ Αἰσώπου τι γελοῖον: οἱ δὲ σκώπτους᾿, ἵν̓ ἐγὼ γελάσω, καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθῶμαι. [Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13, 20, γελάσαντες ἀφήσετε, and Or. 23 § 206.]

The Scholiast on this place (see in Spengel's Ed. p. 158), tells, apropos of this, the story from Demosth. de Cor. §§ 51, 52, with additions. The Scholiast, Ulpian on the passage of Dem., and a scholiast on Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 24 b 20 (in Brandis' collection, Arist. Op. Bekker's 4to. vol. IV. p. 147 b 43 of Bekker's quarto ed. of Aristotle), all agree that Demosthenes' joke consisted in an intentional mispronunciation of the word μισθωτός, which he applied to Aeschines, pronouncing it μίσθωτος, in order to divert the attention of the audience: he appealed to them to say whether the word was not well applied: they burst into a roar of laughter, accepted the application, and shouted Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός, Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός, with the pronunciation corrected. I entirely agree with Dissen that this is a foolish and improbable story, absurd in itself, and receiving no countenance from the text of Demosthenes. All that he did say is found in the existing text, viz. that he interpreted Aeschines' ξενίαν Ἀλεξάνδρου—which Aesch. claimed—as meaning that he was not a ξένος, a guest and friend, but a μισθωτὸς (a hireling) Ἀλεξάνδρον and nothing more, and that the people accepted this version. See Dissen's note on § 52.

（εὐμάθεια, docilitas, need not be made a separate topic, because) ‘any speaker may refer to this (carry back, i. e. apply) any thing he pleases (any of the topics of the προοίμιον), even the appearance of worth and respectability; for to these (τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι) the audience is always more inclined to attend’. (This is in fact the ἀρετή which the speaker must always assume by his speech, in order that his hearers may have confidence in him, that he may have weight and authority with them; one of the three ingredients in the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, II 1. 5. Introd. on ἦθος, p. 108 seq.) In short, εὐμάθεια need not be made a separate topic, provided only the speaker treats the other topics of the προοίμιον with the view of making the audience docilcs, that is, ready to receive the information which he is prepared to communicate to them.

‘The things to which the audience is most inclined to listen are things great (momentous, important), things of special interest (to the hearers themselves), things wonderful (surprising), and things pleasant (to hear; either in themselves, or in their associations); and therefore the speaker should always try to produce the impression (ἐν in his hearers' minds) that things of such kinds are his subject. If he wish to make them inattentive (he must try to convey the impression, ἐὰν μή, subaudi ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃ τις—προσεκτικούς) that his subject is trifling, has no reference to them and their interests (that is, is unimportant in general, or to them in particular: the opposite of the τὰ ἴδια in this preceding topic) or that it is unpleasant’.

On interesting and uninteresting topics, see the parallel passages in Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 3, where those of Aristotle are subdivided: Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23: Cic., Orat. Part. c. 8, expresses Ar.'s ἴδια, Coniuncta cum ipsis apud quos agetur.

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‘However it must not be forgotten that all such things as these (all these ordinary contents of the προοίμια) are foreign to (outside; extra, not secundum, artem) the speech (and its real object, which is the proof of the case, and that alone, αἱ δὲ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, I 1. 3): it is only because the audience is bad, and ready to listen to things beside the real question, (that these are addressed to them); for if he be not such, there is no occasion for an exordium (to flatter him into a good humour, and the rest), except just so far as to state the case in a summary way, that, like a body, it may have a head on it’. There is probably a reference in this to σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, as the enthymemes, or direct logical proofs, are called I 1. 3.

φαῦλος, as applied to the audience or judges, means here not morally bad, but only defective in intellect and patience, too ignorant and frivolous to attend long to sound and serious reasoning: they require to be relieved and diverted occasionally. So Schrader. Comp. what is said of the ‘single judge’ in 12. 5. Of the summary προοίμιον, the Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 2, gives two examples.

ἵνα—κεφαλήν] Comp. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 a 19, of σοφία; νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἔπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. Plat. Gorg. 505 D, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ̓ ἐπιθέντας, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιΐῃ. Phaedr. 264 C, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον μήτε ἄπουν, κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 66 D. Polit. 277 C. Legg. VI 752 A. Stallbaum and Heindorf ad loc. Gorg. Thompson ad loc. Phaedri [et Gorg.]. The notion conveyed in all these places is the same, a headless animal is incomplete. See note in Introd. p. 341, on the book, which, without a preface, looks like a man going out into the street without his hat. This gives the same notion of want of finish and completeness. Quint. IV 1. 72, Haec de prooemio, quoties erit eius usus: non semper autem est; nam et supervacuum aliquando est, si sit praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc iudex, aut si res praeparatione non eget. Aristoteles quidem in totum id necessarium apud bonos iudices negat; seq. Comp. XII 10.52, Quod si mihi des concilium iudicum sapientum...Neque enim affectus omnino movendi sunt, nec aures delectatione mulcendae, quum etiam prooemia supervacua esse apud tales Aristoteles existimet.

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‘Besides, this making the hearers disposed to listen (keep up their attention), is common to all the parts of the speech alike, wherever it is required: for they are more inclined to relax it anywhere rather than at the opening. It is absurd therefore to fix its place (‘post’ it) at the beginning, a time when everybody listens with the greatest attention’. Cic. de Or. II 79. 323 quoted on § 7, οὐ γὰρ <*>᾿εὶ συμφέρει. Also Quint. IV. 1. 73, who follows Arist. in quoting Prodicus' artifice. ‘And therefore, (not only at the beginning, but) wherever there is occasion, such phrases as this must be used, “And now attend to what I say, for it is no more my affair than yours”; or, “I'll tell such a strange thing—or a thing so marvellous—as you have never yet heard before.” And this is like what Prodicus said, “whenever his audience were inclined to be drowsy, he would slip them in a taste of the fifty drachm”’. παρεμβάλλειν, throw them in by the side of the rest, on the sly, (παραδιηγεῖσθαι, infra 16.5). The ‘fifty drachm’ was Prodicus' most famous, and interesting, and expensive lecture. Plat. Crat. 384 B, Σωκρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἀκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέ σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος: νῦν δε οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

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‘But (that all this is beside the point, and extra artem;) that it is not addressed to the hearer as a hearer (read by all means ᾗ ἀκροατής sc. ἐστι: i. e., that it is addressed to him as a hearer and something more, as a man liable to all the defects and infirmities and feelings above mentioned) ‘is plain: for speakers invariably employ their exordia either in prejudicing (the audience against the adversary), or in the endeavour to remove similar apprehensions (of the like suspicions and prejudices) from themselves’. If the audience were mere impartial listeners, met there to hear and judge the case, and nothing more; there would be no occasion for all this accusation and defence with which the orators always fill their prooemia.

The first example referred to, the excuse of the φύλαξ for his lack of speed and his unwelcome message, Soph. Antig. 223 seq., is a case of ἀπολογεῖσθαι φόβους, ‘to remove the threatened danger, or postpone it as long as he can, by a defence’: and the application is, that if he had not been afraid of Creon, if he had been quite sure that Creon was an altogether impartial hearer, he would not have indulged in such a long preface. The second is an example of the same kind from Eur. Iph. Taur. 1162, Thoas to Iphigenia, τί φροιμιάζει νεοχμόν; ἐξαύδα σαφῶς. The actual defence is confined to one line (1161), but Thoas suspects her of entering upon a long apology. Buhle, who could not have looked at the passage, says “Iphig. longo exordio utentem.” The Scholiast (Spengel's Ed. p. 161) here gives a long paraphrase of the watchman's speech. After this, incredible as it may appear, he adds τὸ δὲ τί φροιμιάζῃ τοῦ Κρέοντός ἐστι λέγοντος, as if this had been a continuation of the line from the Antigone.

‘And those who have, or suppose themselves to have, a bad case (lit. their case bad) are apt to indulge in long prooemia: for it is better for them to dwell upon anything rather than upon their case’.—This also is illustrated by the speech of the φύλαξ in the Antigone: and perhaps was suggested by it; for it is not very consecutive—‘And this is why slaves (when charged with a fault, and excusing themselves to their masters) never answer the questions directly, but (state) the attending (surrounding) circumstances, and make a long (roundabout) preface (before they come to the point)’. On τὰ κύκλῳ see 19. 33. Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. II 45, Non hic te carmine ficto Atque per ambages et longa exorsa tencbo.

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‘The topics for conciliating good will have been already stated’ (φιλία 11 4, ἔλεος 11 8, especially, from the quotation following. II 1. 7, περὶ δ᾽ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν. Cic. de Inv. I 16. 22, benevolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur, seq.) ‘as well as (for exciting) any feeling of the same kind in general (any of the πάθη in Bk. II 2—11). And since the saying is true, seeing that it is well said “Grant that I may come to the Phaeacians an object of love and pity”— Hom. Od. ή [VII] 327,—it follows that these two (to make ourselves loveable and pitiable) are what we ought to aim at (for this purpose)’.

δύο] here is indeclinable, like ἄμφω sometimes. As only the first four numerals in Greek (and Sanskrit; the first three in Latin) are declinable; δύο occasionally follows the general rule of indeclinability. In Homer this is the usual form (see Damm's Lex. s. v.); in later and Attic writers not so frequent. Several examples are to be found in Ellendt's Lex. Soph., Sturz, Lex. Xen. See Schweighäuser, Lex. Herod. for instances with fem. plur. Analogous to this of Arist. is δύο νέων ἀνειλκυσμένων, Thuc. III 89. Aristoph. δύο μυριάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν. Plat. Gorg. 464 B, δύο λέγω τέχνας. Eur. Bacch. 916, δύο ἡλίους. Orest. 1401, λέοντες δύο, Phoen. 55, &c.

‘In the epideictic prooemia the hearer must be made to suppose that he is a sharer in the praise, either personally, or by his family, or his studies and pursuits, or at any rate somehow or other: for what Socrates (i. e. Plato, Menex. 235 D, supra 1 9. 30) says in his funeral oration is quite true, that it is easy enough to praise Athenians at (friendly) Athens; the difficulty lies in doing it at Sparta (amongst rivals and enemies)’. The old adj. ἁμός, ‘some’, survives in several forms found in most Greek authors; ἁμῶς (γέ πως) and ἁμῇ (γέ πῃ), sc. ὁδῷ, ἁμοῦ, ἁμόθεν, and the compounds οὐδαμός, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδαμῆ (or μῇ), οὐδαμόθεν, οὐδαμόσε, and the same with μή.

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‘The exordia of the public oration are borrowed from those of the forensic speech, but are naturally very rare in it: for in fact the subject of it is one with which they are already well acquainted, and therefore the facts of the case require no preface (no preparatory explanation) except—if at all—on his own account or that of the adversary (δἰ αὐτόν to put himself right with the audience, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι; ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας to meet the adversary's charges, combat the prejudices the other has raised against him: both of these therefore are accidental), or in case the subject (this is essential) is not considered by them of the precise degree of importance which you wish, but rated either too high or too low.’ As to τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, we had been told before, c. 13. 3, προοίμιον δὲ...ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ἦ: as in Demosth. de Corona, and de Falsa Legatione. Comp. Quint. III 8. 8, who borrows this from Aristotle, Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et a nostra, et ab eius qui dissentiet persona, duci frequenter in consiliis exordium, quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere; nonnunquam etiam ut minor res maiorve videatur: in demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.

‘And hence the necessity of either raising or doing away with prejudice (διό, because when there is an adversary, as there always is in dicastic practice, the same treatment in deliberative speaking is necessarily required) and (the topics) of amplification and diminution (to meet the other requirement, ἐὰν μὴ ἡλικὸν βούλει, ὑπολοιπόν, κ.τ.λ.）’

On the κοινός τόπος (or τόποι) αὔξησις and μείωσις, see II 26. 1. Ib. 18. 4.

‘These are the circumstances in which a preface is required (δεῖται, ὁ λόγος, or ὁ λέγων); either these, or for mere ornament's sake, because, without it, the speech has an off-hand, slovenly (impromptu, extemporaneous) air (note on III 7. 1). For such is Gorgias' encomium on the Eleans; without any preliminary sparring (flourish) or preparatory stirring up he starts abruptly (rushes at once, in medias res; without any previous warning or preparation) with “Elis, blessed city.”

τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἠλ.] Sauppe, Or. Att. Fragm., Fragm. Gorg. No. IV. Nothing more is known of the speech.

προεξαγκωνίσας] is a metaphor from boxing, and denotes a preliminary exercise of the boxer, a swinging, and thrusting to and fro of the arms (lit. elbows), as a preparation for the actual blow, “ex athletarum disciplina ... qui bracchiis sublatis et vibratis pugnae proludunt (I think this is not quite exact: the exercise is not so much to prepare for the encounter with the antagonist, though this of course may be included, as to give weight and impetus to the actual blow). Hinc ab Ar. ad oratorem traductum, qui prooemio quodam utitur priusquam ad rem ipsam deveniat.” Spanheim ad Callim. Hymn. Del. line 322. This word is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον.

προανακινεῖν expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor; the rousing, stirring up, excitement of emotion or interest, as a preparation (πρό) for what is to follow. This is illustrated by Plato, Legg. IV 722 D, λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκε προοίμιά τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. Ib. VII 789 C, of the inspiriting, animating, exciting process—‘quo validiores atque animosiores ad certamina fierent,’ Stallbaum ad locum—which is the object of the training of fighting cocks and quails, (πόνους) ἐν οἷς αὐτὰ ἀνακινοῦσι γυμνάζοντες. Meno, 85 C, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται. Comp. Plut. Cato Mai. c. 26, ἤδη δὲ καὶ προανακινεῖσθαι τοῖς Νομαδικοῖς (Numidae) τοὺς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγῶνας, here literally, in the primary sense, the Numidians were already making preparations to stir up, &c. Ib. π. τοῦ πρώτου ψυχροῦ, c. 9, 948 C, τὰ αἰσθητὰ ταυτὶ προανακινῆσαι, to stir up, by a preparatory examination or study, these sensible elements (of Empedocles &c.)—from all which it seems to me certain that Victorius is incorrect in interpreting this in the same way as the preceding metaphor, “brachia manusque commovere et concutere.” Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v., proludere prooemio quodam, throws no light upon the matter.