History of Universal Supremacy Must Be a Universal History
By means of these facts I presume that what I more than
once asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by
actual experience to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my
assertion, that it is impossible for historians of particular places
to get a view of universal history. For how is it possible for
a man who has only read a separate history of Sicilian or
Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of the
events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and
under what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most
surprising of all revolutions that have happened in our time, I
mean the reduction of all known parts of the world under one
rule and governance, a thing unprecedented in the history of
mankind. In what manner the Romans took
Syracuse or
Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain extent by means of
such particular histories; but how they arrived at universal
supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with
in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to
their success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in
without the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to
appreciate the greatness of their achievements except by the
latter method. For the fact of the Romans having sought to
gain
Iberia, or at another time
Sicily; or having gone on a
campaign with military and naval forces, told by itself, would
not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn that these
were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were
in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost
of one government and commonwealth; and if we see what
dangers and wars in their own territory were, at the very time,
encumbering the men who had all these things on hand: thus,
and only thus, will the astonishing nature of the events fully
dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which they deserve.
So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode
they have become acquainted with universal history. . . .
Hippocrates and Epicydes Take Over Syracuse
Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B. C. 216,
and was assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards,
in B. C. 215. His death, however, did not bring more peaceful
relations between Syracuse and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24, 21). After the slaughter of
Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been elected on the
board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the royal family,
Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but born and
brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on a
special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places
in the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in
the Syracusan government, and for a time kept up an appearance
of wishing to come to terms with Rome; and legates were actually
sent to Marcellus, at Morgantia (near Catana). But when the
Carthaginian fleet arrived at Pachynus, Hippocrates and
Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared that the other
magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This
accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of
Appius with a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush
was made to the shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans
landing; and the tumult was with difficulty composed by the
wisdom of one of the magistrates, Apollonides, who persuaded the
people to vote for the peace with Rome (B. C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28).
But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined not to acknowledge the
peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by plundering in or
near the Roman pale,1 and then took refuge in Leontini.
Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini
was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore,
took Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape,
and by a mixture of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to
force their way into Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the
generals, and induce the excited mob, whom they had inspired
with the utmost dread of being betrayed to Rome, to elect them
sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The Romans at once ordered
Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they were coming not
to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them.