[610c]
we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or
anything else is in this way destroyed.” “But you may be
sure,” he said, “that nobody will ever prove this, that
the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death.”
“But if anyone,” said I, “dares to come to
grips with the argument1 and say, in
order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying
man does become more wicked and unjust,2
we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal
1 Or “to take the bull by the horns.” For ὁμόσε ἰέναι see What Plato Said, p. 457, on Euthyph. 3 C. Cf.ἐγγὺς ἰόντεςPhaedo 95 B.
2 Herbert Spencer nearly does this: “Death by starvation from inability to catch prey shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal.” It recalls the argument with which Socrates catches Callicles in Gorg. 498 E, that if all pleasures are alike those who feel pleasure are good and those who feel pain are bad.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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