James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον κτλ. The sentence is ironical, as is clear from ἐξὸν παρ᾽ ἄλλων (the Sophists forsooth) ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά in D below. Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust before expounding some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. V 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὀρθὴ δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: to that we may, perchance, attain hereafter. See 505 A note

ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι κτλ. On ὀρθὴ δόξα see Men. 97 A—98 A, Theaet. 201 C, Tim. 51 D, E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικὴ or δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: cf. 500 D and IV 430 C notes See in general Zeller^{4} II 1. pp. 588 ff.

σκολιά=‘crooked,’ ‘awry’ is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὀρθαὶ δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be ‘crooked.’ This is true, but αἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and αἰσχρά, which looks back to αἰσχραί, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλά— σκολιά. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὀρθὴ δόξα. If you wish for ‘science,’ go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and ‘hear things bright and beautiful.’ φανά τε καὶ καλά may be an allusion to the ‘lumina orationis’ of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 E note σκότια, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.