James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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αἵ γε -- ἡδοναὶ κτλ. The emphasis is on διὰ τοῦ σώματος. All pleasures belong of course to the soul (Tim. 64 B); but some come through the body, while others—the pleasures of knowledge, for example, according to Plato—do not (cf. Theaet. 184 E—185 E and generally Phil. 47 D ff.). Most of the former class—smell is an exception— and the greatest among them (τἀφροδίσια Phil. 65 C) are only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί (cf. Phaedr. 258 E, Phil. 45 A—47 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 13. 1153^{a} 33, 15. 1154^{a} 26 ff.), and so ‘mixed’ and unreal: compare the picture of the χαραδριοῦ βίος in Gorg. 494 B ff. The same is true of the purely spiritual pleasures and pains which come from the anticipation of these ‘mixed’ pleasures and pains. On the pleasures and pains of anticipation see Phil. 32 C ff.

προησθήσεις is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading προαισθήσεις (Ξ and Vind. B) held its ground till Bekker; but προησθήσεις had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in Cl. Rev. II p. 228).

προλυπήσεις: thus for example τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν (sc. ἐλπιζόμενον) is φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν (Phil. l. c.). If bodily pleasure is ‘mixed,’ the same must be true of bodily pain: and so the προλυπήσεις as well as the προησθήσεις of anticipation are ‘mixed’ (κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν). Fear for example (which is προσδοκία κακοῦ) is a ‘mixed’ pain: see Phil. 47 E.