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προσετίθεμεν: ‘used to attribute to,’ sc. before you announced your view—with ironical deference, like ἐλέγομεν in Prot. 353 C τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς <*>ττω ε<*>ναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; Stallbaum takes the imperfect as referring to 345 C, but neither there nor in 348 C (cited by Schneider) is there anything to justify a particular reference. ἐμοὶ γὰρ -- λέγειν. A similar remark is made after Callicles has expounded kindred views in Gorg. 492 D σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ. can only mean ‘what you think about the truth,’ not ‘what you think to be the truth’ (D. and V.) or ‘your real mind’ (Schneider and Jowett). We should expect ἀδικίας for ἀληθείας, as H. Wolf proposed to read, for it is Injustice, not Truth, which is the subject of dispute. But as ἀδικίας has not a vestige of support from the MSS, I have not ventured to make the change. The truth in question must be understood as the truth about justice and injustice. Herwerden's ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (for which he compares Dem. de Cor. 17, 226, and 294) will hardly command assent. τί δέ -- ἐλέγχεις; Cf. Charm. 161 C πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.
The Republic of Plato. James Adam. 1902. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
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