James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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τότε διομολογησόμεθα κτλ. This is not “an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject” (J. and C.), for if Socrates declared at this stage that justice is a good for its possessor he would in point of fact be presupposing the results of the whole investigation. See IX 588 B—592 B. Others (e.g. Hirzel der Dialog p. 237 note) have taken τότε διομολογησόμεθα as a hint of the additional discussion on Poetry in Book X: but there is nothing either here or in that book to justify any such interpretation. Cf. X 595 A note What Plato's regulations about λόγοι περὶ ἀνθρώπων would have been may be easily gathered from the end of Book IX and X 608 C ff., although the subject is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the Republic. Cf. I 347 E note

392C - 394D We have now finished our treatment of the subject-matter of poetry, and have next to discuss its form. All composition is in a certain sense narrative, narrating things past, present or future. Narration in this sense may be either (1) simple and unmixed, (2) imitative, (3) both simple and imitative. Homer furnishes an example of the third kind: his poetry is purely narrative, when he is speaking in propria persona, it is imitative, when he puts his words into the mouth of any of his characters. Tragedy and Comedy exemplify the imitative style. The best example of the purely narrative is the Dithyramb, of the third or mixed variety, the Epic. Which of these forms shall we admit, and on what occasions?

ff. That Poetry and Art are a species of μίμησις, was an accepted canon in Greece even before the time of Plato: see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art^{2} p. 121. Starting from this principle, Plato gradually deepens and intensifies the connotation of μίμησις as the dialogue advances. At first, the word denotes a specific variety of style— the dramatic as opposed to the narrative (392 D—394 D). But as according to Plato style is at once the expression of, and also exercises a reflex influence on, the soul (400 D note), μίμησις begins to assume an ethical import and is used to express imitation or assimilation in matters appertaining to or bearing upon character and conduct (394 E, 395 C notes: cf. also 401 B—404 C). Finally, in Book X, after the psychological point of view has been superseded by the metaphysical, the word acquires an ontological or metaphysical significance: see on X 595 C. On the subject generally, reference may be made to the dissertation of Abeken de μιμήσεως apud Platonem et Aristotelem notione.

τὸ δὲ λέξεως. Hartman approves the variant τὰ δὲ λέξεως: but the subject of λέξις is better treated as a unity until it has been subdivided.