James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος is cancelled by Badham and others. It is difficult however not to feel that something is wanted to balance χαλεστραίου and κονίας, especially as these are two specific detergents of the same class. Further, without παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος Plato would probably have written καὶ λύπη κτλ. The sentence as it stands rings Platonic; nor was παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος at all likely to be added by a scribe. The words were also in the text used by Stobaeus and Theo Smyrnaeus: see Flor. 43. 97 and de utilit. math. p. 14. I suggest the following interpretation. The action of pleasure differs from that of pain, fear, and desire, in being more gentle, and less violent (βίαιος). Pleasure in short relaxes (χαλᾷ) while pain (of which fear and desire as such are both varieties) contracts: cf. III 411 A on the effect of γλυκεῖαι ἁρμονίαι, Tim. 66 C and Stallbaum on Phil. 46 D. Now χαλεστραίου suggests χαλᾶν, and it is probably for this reason that Plato compares pleasure to it. Such a play on words is quite in Plato's manner: cf. Prot. 361 D. If we suppose that other ῥύμματα were harder, and less agreeable in their action, the point of comparing pain etc. with ‘every other detergent’ will appear.

τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν has been questioned, on the ground that beasts cannot have ὀρθὴ δόξα. It was no doubt a feeling of this kind which gave birth to the reading αὐτήν for ὀρθήν in some inferior MSS. Herwerden employs his favourite remedy of excision; and other equally unsatisfactory remedies will be found in Hartman. The text is quite sound. True opinion is in Plato the basis of action done in ignorance of what is right but in obedience to an authority which knows. A dog and a slave act from true opinion as often as they obey a master who orders them to do what is right. So also (among others) Rettig (Proleg. p. 109) and Krohn (Pl. St. p. 42) rightly understand the passage. Cf. note on πολιτικήν in C below.

οὔτε -- τε=‘not only not—but also’ lays stress on the second clause: cf. 427 C, VIII 566 D, E, IX 587 A al.

μόνιμον. See cr. n. The reading of some of Stobaeus' MSS (Flor. 43. 97) (which Dobree and others approved) appears to me almost certainly right, although it has been adopted by no recent editor. νόμιμον, as Rettig shews (Proleg. p. 110), must be used in precisely the same sense as in δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου just before. If so, Plato flatly (except for the οὔτε πάνυ) contradicts himself. For the only reason why a δόξα is ὀρθή is that it is νόμιμος ‘in accordance with the law’: nor is it possible for even a dog to possess an ὀρθὴ δόξα which is not νόμιμος. In obeying a just command, the δόξα of a dog is therefore not οὐ πάνυ νόμιμος, but wholly νόμιμος. On the other hand μόνιμον is not only appropriate but necessary in what is practically a résumé of Socrates' whole account of courage (δοκεῖς γάρ μοι —καλεῖν). The only difference between the ὀρθὴ δόξα of a guardian and a dog lies in this, that the former has received παιδεία, while the latter has not. And it is precisely this difference which makes the guardian's δόξα lasting, as the whole of the simile from dyeing was intended to shew (ἵνα δευσοποιὸς κτλ. 430 A). Finally, the soldier's ὀρθὴ δόξα has just been defined (in 430 B) as σωτηρίαν διὰ παντός κτλ. To διὰ παντός the words οὐ πάνυ μόνιμον are the necessary contrast: the δόξα is in both cases ὀρθή τε καὶ νόμιμος, only you can depend on the guardian always, ἔν τε λύπαις καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις (429 D), but not always on your dog and slave. Cf. Men. 97 E f.

ἄλλο τε -- ἀνδρείαν. With the sentiment cf. Lach. 197 A ff., where however it is because they are destitute of knowledge that courage is denied to the lower animals. Isocrates Antid. 211 speaks of dogs etc. as brave.