James Adam, The Republic of Plato

Στησίχορος κτλ. See Phaedr. 243 A and Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} III pp. 214 ff. There is no real ground for supposing (with Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I pp. 113 ff.) that Plato intends an allusion to Isocrates' Helena, in spite of περιμάχητος in Hel. 40 and the reference to Stesichorus ib. 64. Instead of τοῦ ἀληθοῦς Floyer Sydenham conjectured τῆς ἀληθοῦς (see Cl. Rev. II p. 229). It is more like Plato's suggestiveness to say ‘the truth’ than ‘the true Helen,’ which would moreover (as Lupton points out l.c.) rather be τῆς ἀληθινῆς.

586C - 588A The pleasures of anger, unless pursued in conformity with reason, are similarly unreal. We may even venture to say that it is only when obedient to knowledge that the desires of the two lower parts of soul can attain those pleasures which are in the highest sense their own and true—so far as it is possible for them to have true pleasures at all. Now the tyrannical desires are farthest from reason, so that the tyrant has least pleasure. By an elaborate calculation it is shewn that the king lives seven-hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly than the tyrant; and if the just man so far surpasses the unjust in respect of pleasure, how much greater will be his transcendence in beauty and virtue!

ἕτερα τοιαῦτα κτλ. The satisfaction of τὸ θυμοειδές is also no true pleasure, but only λύπης ἀπαλλαγή. See Phil. 47 E. αὐτὸ τοῦτο means τὸ τοῦ θυμοειδές. The verb διαπράττηται is used as in IV 440 D οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ κτλ. φιλοτιμίαν, φιλονικίαν and δυσκολίαν (‘ill temper’ cf. III 411 C) are particular forms of the principle which Plato calls τὸ θυμοειδές. Each of them is a κενότης and painful. The κενότης is filled, as the case may be, by τιμή, νίκη, or θυμός (indulgence in anger): hence πλησμονὴν τιμῆς κτλ. On the spelling φιλονικίαν, which the present passage, like others in Plato, clearly points to, see 581 B note