Reginald Walter Macan, Herodotus, The Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books with Introduction and Commentary

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πολλὸς ἐνέκειτο λέγων τοιάδε: π. ἐν., cp. 8. 59, 9. 91.

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τοιάδε does not guarantee the ipsissima verba of the following speech.

ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες: he addresses the envoys all, not merely the Lakedaimonian. The formula does not disown Hellenism for the speaker's part.

λόγον ... πλεονέκτην. Is πλεονέκτης an adjectival substantive? (“τύχη σωτήρ” Soph. O. T. 80; βοῦς ἡγεμών Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 29, ‘bellator equus,’ etc.).

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ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος: sc. ὑμέων. This statement is, indeed, remarkable: does it preserve incidentally a reminiscence of a previous war of Gelon's with the Carthaginians, or is it a rhetorical confusion, in which the impending war with Carthage is anticipated (c. 165 infra), or should it lead us to antedate that war so as to make it precede the embassy of 481 B.C.? This last alternative is to be rejected. (1) The synchronism between the invasions of Greece and of Sicily is a very strong tradition, and (2) was probably not accidental but part of a general plan and combination between Xerxes and Carthage, which, if historical, guarantees in turn the synchronism; cp. c. 165 infra. Have we then simply a piece of idle rhetoric here in which Hdt. or his authorities confusedly antedated the coming war<*> Hdt. can hardly have done so, he must take two different wars to be intended, as he specifies both; and the particularity and character of the request of Gelon has a very strong air of verisimilitude. We must therefore take the reference to be to an entirely distinct war. But there is hardly room for the great invasion <*> Sicily in 480 B.C. and a previous Punic war since the accession of Gelon, nor is any such elsewhere reported, to say nothing of his time having been fully filled by his wars already related. What then is the solution of the problem? The reference may be to a Punic war under Hippokrates, a dim report of which has come down to us and which is here transferred to Gelon, who may, indeed, have taken an aetive and a prominent part in it, but was not in a position to negotiate, at least as principal and sovran, with the Greeks of the mother-country. Cp. Freeman, Sicily, ii. Appendix VIII. The Events after the Expedition of Dorieus.

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τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω πρὸς Ἐγεσταίων φόνον: the story now stands in 5. 42-46, without any referenee to the efforts of Gelon (or Hippokrates) to exact penalties for it: an evidence (as Blakesley rightly observes) of the independent sourees of this and that story, and (one may add) of Hdt.'s insouciance in sueh matters. The occurrence of the patronymic here would not of course in any case (least of all in a reported speech) prove the priority in composition of this passage: nor could a back reference be here expected; nor would the absence of a forward reference in that passage disprove the earlier ‘provenienee’ of this— granted that Hdt. is not serupulous of such minutiae. Cp. Introduction, §§ 7, 8. Materially this passage is caleulated to enhance the significance of the attempted foundation of an ‘Herakleia’ by Dorieus in the sphere of Carthaginian influence, and to discredit the oracular morals imported into it and so acceptable to Hdt. There was to be a fresh attempt τὰ ἐμπόρια ἑλευθεροῦν—i.e. to recover Selinous, and other places, which had fallen into the hands of Carthage, after the failure of Dorieus, for the Greek merchants and markets.

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ἀπ᾽ ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλαι ὠφελίαι τε καὶ ἐπαυρήσιες γεγόνασι: these words have been accused of exaggeration and suspected as corrupt (ὑμῖν for ἡμῖν?): but there is no need of emendation, and the sentence should be regarded as good evidence for the importance of the Sicilian and generally the west Mediterranean trade to the merchants of old Greece. Gelon is addressing an embassy in which Korinth and other Peloponnesian cities, as well as Athens and the Ionian States, at least of Euboia, are represented: there seems no exaggeration whatever in emphasizing the past (and possible) gains to those States from the restriction of Carthaginian rivalry in the west; nor need the ἐμπόρια be geographically confined to Sicily.

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τὸ ... κατ᾽ ὑμέας, ‘as far as ye are coneerned’; cp. c. 148 supra, 171 infra.

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Γέλωνος μνῆστις γέγονε has almost the air of a proverb, or apophthegm: perhaps a genuine utterance of the man, cp. c. 156 ad f. (The verb μνάομαι is used not merely for ‘to remember,’ but for ‘to woo,’ e.g. c. 9 supra: the substantive seems used only in the former sense, otherwise ‘Ha! Ha! the wooing o't’ might serve as a rendering.)

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ἕτοιμος εἰμὶ βοηθέειν παρεχόμενος κτλ.: this offer of Gelon's, even with the condition attached, can hardly be historical (cp. Appendix III. § 6 (c); but this observation in no way bars our accepting the catalogue of his forces as substantially authentic. The conveyance of such numbers to Hellas would have been a difficulty, even if the tyrant could have denuded Sicily and Syracuse of the supports of his power, and the bulwarks against Carthage; but he may have had such forces at his disposal in 481 B.C., and if so was certainly the first power in the Hellenic world.

διηκοσίας τε τριήρεας: just the number mobilized by contemporary Athens (cp. c. 144 supra). In 431 B.C. the Peloponnesians were expecting to get 200, if not 240 ships from Sicily and Italy. (Cp. Thuc. 2. 7. 2, ed. Hude, 1898, who accepts Herbst's emendation from Diod. 12. 41, without even mentioning Donaldson, who more than anticipated it.)

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δισμυρίους ὁπλίτας: even Athens in 431 B.C. reckoned more hoplites, Thuc. 2. 13. 6. Whether these heavy, soldiers of Gelon's were all ‘citizens’ is another matter (neither were the hoplites of Athens all citizens).

δισχιλίην ἵππον: an arm sadly lacking the Greeks in 480 B.C. Gelon himself doubtless relied on this force; cp. c. 154 supra. The figure is reasonable, for Sicily; cp. Thuc. 6. 67.

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δισχιλίους τοξότας ... σφενδονήτας . . ἱπποδρόμους ψιλούς: the large proportion of light-armed troops and cavalry in the forces of Gelon show how far his military establishment was ahead of the Greeks of old Hellas. A large proportion of the cavalry, and probably all the ψιλοί, were doubtless mercenaries, and probably ‘barbarians.’ The σφενδονῆται, for example, may have been Balearic. Gelon himself may have relied upon their services, not merely against Carthage, but against the Syracusan citizens. Gelon's army must partially have anticipated in character the foices of Jason (cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 1).

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σῖτόν τε ἁπάσῃ τῇ †Ἑλλήνων στρατιῇ is more <*>like an exaggeration than any other item, for (1) why should the supplies available in Greece be ignored? (2) the offer begs the question of the plan of campaign. Perhaps Ἑλλήνων is de trop, Gelon merely undertaking to support his own men on service.

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ἐπὶ δὲ λόγῳ τοιῷδε, ‘on the following condition.’ Gelon was certainly the best general in the world at that moment, and had the Greeks possessed such a complete unity of στ ρατηγία and ἡγεμονία they could not have blundered as they did. But this critique is hardly articulate in the reported offer of Gelon; yet cp. c 162 infra.