Reginald Walter Macan, Herodotus, The Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books with Introduction and Commentary

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οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: they act en masse as above addressed, ἄνδρες Ἀθ.

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ὁρμέατο βοηθέειν: cp. ὁρμημένους διώκειν c. 59. The pl.p. ὁρμέατο marks the depth, or intensity, of their emotion, or the instantaneous rapidity of their action. The position of ταῦτα is emphatic. τὰ μάλιστα, 8. 97. ἤδη στείχουσι: the Athenians are actually on the way to the support of the Lakedaimonians, or to effect a juncture with them, but fail to carry out their intention, or this manœuvre, in consequence of being attacked, or intercepted, by the medizing Greeks, or some of them. στείχειν, cp. c. 56 supra.

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οἱ ἀντιταχθέντες = οἱ ἀντιτεταγμένοι c. 31 supra. The description of οἱ ἀντιταχθέντες as a part of (the) Greeks τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος γενομένων is rather curious at this point; in c. 31 they are described as τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ (i.e. Μαρδονιου） ἐόντας Ἐλληνων.

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τὸ προσκείμενον: collective for o. προσκείμενοι, cp. τὸ ἀσθενέστερον c. 31

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οὕτω δή, not of time so much as of causation. μουνωθέντες, ‘without support’: the Athenians could still fall back on Marathon, where, μοῦνοι Ἑλλήνων δὴ <προ> μαχήσαντες τῷ Πέρσῃ, they had defeated forty-six nations, c. 27 supra; whereas at Plataia there was but one, the Persian, opposed to the Spartans and Tegeans, c. 31 supra.

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πεντακισμύριοι: i.e. 5000 Spartiate hoplites, 5000 Lakedaimonian hoplites, 35,000 helots in attendance on the Spartiates, 5000 in attendance on the Lakedaimonians, in accordance with the calculations in cc. 29, 30 supra. But the calculation for the ψιλοί at least has been disallowed; cp. notes to ll.c.; and perhaps the total number of hoplites ought to be reduced by a quarter, if not by a half.

τρισχίλιοι: i.e. 1500 hoplites, 1500 ψιλοί, ibid. The reassertion of these numbers at this point is remarkable: no allowance is made for losses previous. There was little or no excuse for the request to the Athenians for the τοξόται. And what a host the right wing was, compared with the Athenians, here, or at Marathon!

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ἀπεσχίζοντο, middle, ‘separated from’: if the Athenians owed anything to the Plataians, e.g. at Marathon, the Spartans owed still more to the Tegeatai at Plataia!

ἐσφαγιάζοντο ὡς συμβαλέοντες Μαρδονίῳ. This statement comes abruptly and with a shock: it proves that the Spartans were contemplating not merely battle, and self-defence, but the assumption of the offensive (συμβάλλειν = μάχης ἄρχειν, cp. cc. 41, 45 supra). It suggests that the retirement of the Lakedaimonians was purely a reculer pour mieux sauter; it shows that everything was proceeding en règle in the Spartan position, Teisamenos (cc. 33, 36 supra) inspecting the sacrifices in order to determine by their aid, and possibly on a sign from Euryanax, or Pausanias, the right moment for the charge. On the verb σφαγιάζεσθαι cp. c. 72 infra.

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καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ τῇ παρεούσῃ. These words refer presumably to the Persian forces with Mardonios, and imply that only a portion of his army was in action. (a) The corps of Artabazos was not there, c. 66 infra. (b） The Medes, Baktrian, Indian, Sakan corps were apparently coming on pêlemêle, anyhow, c. 59 supra. (c) The medizing Greeks, so far as they were taking any part in the action at all (cp. c. 67 infra), were fully engaged with the Athenians (just above) and perhaps with other Greek corps. (d) The Persian cavalry, which has been reported above, c. 60, as engaged with the Lakedaimonians, but which now seems to be doing nothing against them, was perhaps engaged elsewhere (possibly against the Greek centre, or right centre, upon the Plataia-Athens road, cp. note to c. 52. 7). The army of Mardonios appears to be far less in being than the Greek forces themselves, each division of which, at least, is still a compact unit.

οὐ γάρ σφι ἐγίνετο τὰ σφάγια χρηστά: sc. μάχης ἄρχουσι, συμβολὴν ποιευμένοις, or such like. χρηστά is perhaps superfluous; cp. c. 36 supra.

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ἔπιπτον, ‘were being killed,’ as distinguished from those who were merely wounded: they were all alike sitting on the ground (cp. c. 72 infra） and probably crouching under their shields (cp. c. 48 supra), as they had, no doubt, been doing the greater part of the previous day.

ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ here at least covers some time in duration; cp. c. 56 supra. The proportion of wounded to killed is unfortunately not stated: in an ordinary conflict between two heavyarmed Greek forces it was probably not great; but in the present case no doubt it was unusually large (πολλῷ πλεῦνες): only 91 Spartiates at most were killed, cp. c. 70 infra.

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φράξαντες γὰρ τὰ γέρρα οἱ Πέρσαι. The use of the γέρρον (cp. 7. 61) proves that the Persians here in action are infantry. The exact nature of the contrivance here described is in some doubt. Rustow supposed that each Persian fixed his long light wicker shield in the ground by means of a point below: such ‘a wall of shields’ would, of course, offer but a slight protection against the push of the hoplites. Others (cp. Baehr ad l., and esp. Stein ad l.) suppose that the Persians had devised a new plan against the Greeks: συνεφόρησαν τὰ γέρρα ἕρκος εἶναι σφίσι c. 99 infra. Yes, no doubt at Mykale, where the Persians were acting throughout on the defensive; but not here at Plataia (or rather, in front of Hysiai!) where they were advancing to the attack. In this case, at most, the individual soldier fixed his shield in the ground, in line with his neighbours, so that there was a front, a screen, a fence of shields (φράγμα 8. 52, φραγμός 7. 36, 142), hence φράξαντες here. (The helots may have been throwing stones.)

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ἀφειδέως: cp. c. 39 supra; here in a somewhat different sense, largiter, copiose, cp. 1. 163, 207 (Schweighaeuser).

πιεζομένων: cp. πιεζομένην c. 60 supra; the Spartans are acting still strictly on the defensive—they are, in fact, apparently doing nothing, still unable χρήσασθαι τῇ χειρί (c. 72 infra).

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τῶν σφαγίων οὐ γινομένων: Baehr says, χρι, τῶν hic optime carebit oratio. Why, the <*> not everywhere? Cp. 7. 134, and c. 41 supra, 62 infra. The sign they a awaiting is the sign in favonr of the <*>rising up and going for the Persians.

ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν Παυσανίην. Did Pausanias ‘raise his eyes’ (Rawlinson)? Did he look ‘up’ to the Heraion? Was he on lower ground? Or did he do more than ‘look away to,’ ‘fix his eyes upon’ the Heraion? The upward look is not essential to ἀποβλέπειν 7. 135 (cp. ἀναβλέπειν, though not as in 2. 111). For what reason did Pausanias fix his gaze on the Heraion? Ex hypothesi in order the better to invoke the goddess. What did he see? Could he see the Greek left, or left centre, in front of the temple, c. 52 supra? Could he see any signal? If there was such a signal given, what intimation did it convey? Or was he directing a signal to that quarter? (Cp. c. 69. 6 infra.）

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τὸ Ἥραιον τὸ Πλαταιέων. Was it really the Heraion he looked to? Was there more than one Heraion in the neighbourhood? There were at least three temples of Eleusinian Demeter, though Hdt. only mentions one of them (cp. c. 57 supra); there was (so far as known) only one temple of Hera, though Hdt. so carefully specifies its Plataian possessive. It was doubtless the principal temple of the district; but strategically more may have been going on at the temple of Demeter, the Plataian one, at this moment, just as later at the Hysian; cp. c. 57 supra. (There was an Heraion at Koroneia, Pausan. 9. 34. 3, apparently the only other one in Boiotia.)

ἐπικαλέσασθαι, to invoke, summon to his aid; cp. 8. 64; here, probably, in audible tones.

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μηδαμῶς σφέας ψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος. This is the very εὐχή of Pausanias. What was the ἐλπίς, for the fulfilment of which he prayed? Was it merely victory as such? Or not rather such a ‘sign’ as would justify his assuming the offensive? In either case the commander is fully in favour of doing battle; for he is surely not hoping simply to make good his retreat! But the intimate connexion between the εὐχή and the ἐλπίς, between the εὐχή and the σφάγια χρηστά, and the coincidence of these with the transition from ‘passive resistance’ to active and offensive tactics, compel us to believe that at this point the situation on the field of battle was such that gods and men, on the Greek side, believed the hour was come to deliver the attack, to charge home upon the foe, behind his fence of shields.

Perhaps two or three things had happened, e.g. (a) the Persian infantry had been drawn across the Asopos in disorder, and were now massed, at short range, behind the feeble barrier of the γέρρα, like sheep for the slaughter, before the Argiopion, and the Plataian temple of Demeter; (b) the Persian cavalry was, perhaps, far off, or quite out of fighting range, and held in check, so far as the road in the rear was concerned, by the right centre in the Plataia-Athens Pass, or thereabouts; (c) from the left came word, or sign, that there was nothing to fear in that quarter; the Thebans alone, of the king's Greek allies, showing fight.

(Blakesley long ago (1854) boldly said that the hope of Pausanias was to bring the whole army of the enemy to action at close quarters: “the problem for Pausanias was to keep his troops perfectly in hand ... until the onset of the enemy became so general that they would no longer have it in their power to avoid a pitched battle,” i.e. upon Pausanias' own terms.)